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ABSTRACT
While scholars and practitioners alike argue that the pursuit of sustainable peace
in post-conflict developing countries requires international interventions to
build state capacity, many debate the precise effects that external assistance
has had on building peace in conflict-affected states. This paper seeks to clear
conceptual ground by proposing a research agenda that disentangles
statebuilding and peacebuilding from each other. Recent scholarship has
made the case that the two endeavours are geared towards distinct sets of
goals, yet few have subjected the causal mechanism underlying those
processes or the relationship between them to sustained theoretical and
empirical inquiry. Additionally, despite decades of mixed results from
international interventions, we lack knowledge of the mechanisms by which
external engagement leads to specific outcomes. To address these gaps, this
paper offers a causal framework for understanding the effects of aid dynamics
on state coherence and the depth of peace. It specifies the variables in that
framework, with a view to establishing a new research agenda to advance our
understanding of statebuilding and peacebuilding. Finally, it proposes that
public service delivery in post-conflict countries offers fertile empirical ground
to hypothesize about and test the relationship between state coherence and
sustainable peace.
International peacebuilding interventions in post-conflict countries are typi-
cally designed as statebuilding efforts that channel high levels of assistance
towards building state capacity, which is in turn believed to enhance their pro-
spects for sustainable peace. Yet statebuilding and peacebuilding are distinct
processes with different logics that may, in reality, both reinforce and contra-
dict each other in specific circumstances. Indeed, part of the reason why inter-
national interventions in post-conflict countries have yielded disappointing
results is that their design is predicated on often untested assumptions
about how the foundations for sustainable peace are best achieved – and
how the different processes for attempting to do so are truly inter-related.
This paper seeks to clear conceptual ground by disentangling statebuilding
from peacebuilding through a focus on the impacts of international aid on
each of these processes. The goal is to establish a theoretically informed
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framework for empirical investigation that has the potential to improve the
results of post-conflict interventions.1
This undertaking charts middle ground through what has become a major
intellectual fault line in the contemporary peacebuilding scholarship. Critical
theorists have explained the relative failure of the peacebuilding enterprise by
reappraising the ‘liberal peacebuilding’model itself and thereby throwing into
question both the international community’s motivation in applying it and
the appropriateness of its content (Weberian bureaucracy, liberal democracy,
and neo-liberal economics) in the post-conflict countries in which it is
attempted.2 Positivist scholars have equally recognized the shortcomings of
international interventions yet, in their empirical studies, have adopted a
problem-solving orientation geared towards improving the design and
implementation of peace operations.3 Despite the prolific and valuable
work on internationalized statebuilding and peacebuilding, however, there
has been surprisingly little research focused on enhancing our understanding
of when and where these processes support and run counter to each other.
The conceptual advance in this paper is not in mounting a new critique of
international peacebuilding. Rather, we propose a research agenda that
addresses the various existing critiques through a new conceptual framework
that has the potential to support a range of empirical studies. In particular,
this paper interrogates the conventional wisdom that creating peace in
post-conflict states must involve building state capacity by asking the follow-
ing questions: Do international efforts to assist post-conflict recovery actually
help to build state capacity?4 And does such an approach to statebuilding
actually contribute to the prospects for and attainment of sustainable peace?5
In the first section of the paper, we argue that although many scholars and
practitioners have acknowledged the problematic conflation of peacebuilding
and statebuilding, there has been little effort to disentangle them analytically.
In the second section, we discuss the benefits of viewing statebuilding and
peacebuilding as distinct causal processes that lead to two separate sets of
outcomes – state coherence and the depth of peace, respectively. To explain
variation in those outcomes, the third section draws on the aid effectiveness
1Transformative peacebuilding operations often also incorporate a democratization component, an objec-
tive that we do not consider here. The broader pursuit of liberal peacebuilding and the international
community’s track record in achieving its goals has been dealt with extensively – see, especially,
Doyle and Sambanis, Making War; Jarstad and Sisk, From War to Democracy; Paris, At War’s End; Westen-
dorf, Negotiating Insecurity; and Whalan, Peace Operations.
2See, especially, Chandler, Empire in Denial; Pugh, “Critical Theory”; and Richmond and Franks, Liberal
Peace Transitions.
3Influential examples of this line of work include Doyle and Sambanis,Making War; Paris, At War’s End; and
Paris and Sisk, Dilemmas of Statebuilding.
4A parallel set of questions regarding the relationship between state capacity and service provision is
posed in Krasner and Risse, “External Actors”. See also Lee, Walter-Drop, and Wiesel, “Taking the
State (Back) Out”; and Hanson, “Complements or Substitutes”.
5Call, “Knowing Peace”; and Paris and Sisk, Dilemmas of Statebuilding point to a number of the intellectual
and practical problems with conflating statebuilding and peacebuilding.
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literature, practitioner insights, and recent work on the political economy of
service delivery to suggest that the nature of specific aid dynamics is a key inde-
pendent variable affecting the outcomes of international intervention. The
fourth section introduces our conceptual framework, which offers a causal
approach to disentangling statebuilding and peacebuilding. We suggest that
this framework could help shape broader empirical research on different
types of intervention by a wide range of actors seeking various objectives. We
thereby hope to facilitate more empirical work on the causal mechanisms by
which post-conflict recovery efforts result in their various outcomes.
Internationalized Statebuilding and Peacebuilding: The Logic
and Its Contradictions
After the end of the Cold War, statebuilding emerged as one of the primary
methods through which peace could be constructed in countries emerging
from conflict. As both scholarship and practice increasingly integrated the
processes of statebuilding and peacebuilding, top-down, externally driven sol-
utions to end internal violence and build a sustainable peace became the inter-
national norm for responding to civil conflicts around the globe.6 Two
assumptions underpin the optimism animating internationalized statebuild-
ing attempts, evident in the ever-expanding scholarship on these issues.
First, there is a widespread belief that statebuilding and peacebuilding are
mutually reinforcing, such that ‘in practice peacebuilding has largely been
operationalized by donors as statebuilding’.7 Second, international interven-
tions are essentially still considered the most effective, even ‘right’, way to
pursue post-conflict peace.8 This is despite an entire vein of critical studies
decrying the structural harm to post-conflict countries that can come as a
result of overly internationalized peacebuilding interventions and the
harmful exclusion of bottom-up initiatives.9 Richmond and Franks have
attributed this to the ‘active, muscular and humanitarian liberal internation-
alism’ of the United States and United Kingdom, exerted through both their
bilateral initiatives and their influence on multilateral institutions such as the
United Nations.10
Hence the manner in which peacebuilding is typically pursued in conflict-
affected countries is through international interventions that channel a large
6Paris, At War’s End; and Richmond and Franks, Liberal Peace Transitions.
7Denney, Mallett, and Mazurana, “Peacebuilding and Service Delivery”. On the conflation between state-
building and peacebuilding see, also, Krasner, “Sharing Sovereignty”; Fukuyama, State-Building; and
Barnett, “Building a Republican Peace”. Some of the problems with this conflation are also pointed to
by Call, “Conclusion”; and Paris and Sisk, Dilemmas of Statebuilding.
8Roland Paris, “Saving Liberal Peacebuilding”.
9On the problems of liberal peacebuilding, see Chandler, Empire in Denial; Cooper, Turner, and Pugh, “Last
Peacebuilder”; and Spears, “False Promise”. On the myopia of international interventions regarding the
‘local’, see Autesserre, Congo; Mac Ginty, Hybrid Forms; and Richmond, Failed Statebuilding.
10Richmond and Franks, Liberal Peace Transitions, 1.
INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING 3
volume of financial and human resources into governments in order to help
them carry out their basic functions and enhance the delivery of public ser-
vices. Assisting governments in this way, the logic goes, helps to build state
capacity, which in turn enhances the prospects for recovery, development,
and peace. The provision of public services is seen as a crucial element of
both statebuilding and peacebuilding, since one of the most fundamental
roles of the state is to deliver the public goods and services expected by
society.11 Indeed, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment’s (OECD) definition of statebuilding, like that of many other statebuild-
ing practitioner agencies, is focused on generating and delivering upon the
social contract.12 The extent to which public services are delivered is, in
turn, a key measure of the quality of post-conflict governance and peaceful
stability, capturing both state capacity as well as the measure of legitimacy
gained by the state as it performs this crucial expected role.13
Yet these relationships among external intervention, state capacity, and
lasting peace – as well as the particular role of public service provision in
the logic of intervention – have typically been asserted without much exam-
ination of the merits of the causal logic. In turn, over the last three decades,
these assertions have been acted upon at great expense and most often with
disappointing outcomes. In no small part, the persistent appeal of internatio-
nalized statebuilding is a result of the fact that the theory and practice of
peacebuilding have been so intertwined since the 1990s that a great deal of
scholarship has been driven by operational concerns. The benefit of this is
apparent: the close dialogue between scholars and practitioners in this field
has meant that they have informed each other more so than in other
crucial contemporary policy areas. Yet there is also a major drawback, in
that our understanding of the causal dynamics of peacebuilding has been
compromised and, as a result, both the goals and outcomes of interventions
remain vague and difficult to measure. Richmond, a staunch critic of the
internationalized peacebuilding via statebuilding approach, has argued that
it will remain impossible to fully understand what can successfully contribute
to peace when these disparate concepts are not examined independently.14
While statebuilding and peacebuilding have converged in both practice and
scholarship, as objects of study they are separate processes rooted in distinct
intellectual lineages. Research on statebuilding originates from much longer
standing literatures than that on peacebuilding. The vast literature on state
formation includes seminal work on how states generated and grew their
administrative structures and also how and why they developed into
11Ghani and Lockhart, Fixing Failed States; Whaites, “States in Development”; and DFID, Literature Review.
12OECD, Concepts and Dilemmas. See also DFID, Building Peaceful States.
13Denney, Mallett, and Mazurana, “Peacebuilding and Service Delivery”; and OECD, Service Delivery.
14Richmond, Failed Statebuilding.
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democratic or autocratic states.15 Much of this longer view of statebuilding
emphasizes the inherently violent nature of the process, with states originally
forming as ‘protection rackets’ among elites attempting to protect against
threats to their property and privilege.16 Other strands of work take a govern-
ance approach that divorces the technical qualities of good or ‘good enough’
governance from the full package of democratic regime attributes.17 What
these different veins of the literature share is a core focus on statebuilding
as the attempt to build the elements of a Weberian state: capacity, authority,
and legitimacy.18
Peacebuilding has long been conceived as the process of building a sustain-
able peace and recovering from conflict, but how it is implemented has evolved
considerably. Embedded within the concept is an implicit theory of conflict res-
olution that is predicated on transforming the sociopolitical roots of conflict.19
In its early guises, peacebuilding was squarely about the process of building resi-
lience into community structures and patterns of relations.20 Yet the liberal
peacebuilding paradigm has in many respects supplanted this earlier con-
ception.21 In 1992, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali defined peace-
building as ‘action to identify and support structures which will tend to
strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict’.22 In so
doing, he redefined peacebuilding as an intervention strategy, with a broad
range of political, economic, and social goals. As put into practice, peacebuild-
ing quickly became a formulaic project of the international community, perpe-
tuated by the scripts and operative frames of international agencies and enacted
upon nations that could not afford to refuse the assistance and thus had to
acquiesce in the way in which it was carried out.23 In this process, the peace-
building project came to focus on building state institutions, with its goals
centred on transforming and expanding the institutional arena in which a gov-
ernment interacts with its citizens. As a result of this state-oriented conception
of how peace is delivered in post-conflict states, institution-building emerged as
the key to peacebuilding success, through internationally managed initiatives to
build and strengthen formal institutions of governance.24 Mac Ginty even notes
that such operations have been described as ‘peace by governance’.25
15Ayoob, “State Making”; Ertman, Leviathan; and Levi, Rule and Revenue.
16Bates, Prosperity & Violence; Tilly, “War Making and State Making”.
17Grindle, “Good Enough Governance”.
18See Lemay-Hébert, “Weberian Approaches”, for a discussion of different conceptions of statebuilding. In
adopting an institutional conception of statebuilding, we explicitly omit nation building activities that
are designed to generate socio-political cohesion.
19Galtung, “Peace Research”.
20This is along the lines of what is labelled peace formation in Richmond, Post-Liberal Peace.
21Paris, “Saving Liberal Peacebuilding”.
22Boutros-Ghali, Agenda for Peace.
23Autesserre, Peaceland.
24Call and Cousens, “Ending Wars”; Menocal, “New Paradigm”; and Paris and Sisk, Dilemmas of
Statebuilding.
25Mac Ginty, Hybrid Forms, 15–6.
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The logic connecting statebuilding to peacebuilding seems straightforward:
endowing governments with the capacity to perform their basic governance
functions, including the unbiased delivery of essential public services and col-
lective public goods, lays a crucial foundation for stable, peaceful societies.
Almost all multilateral and bilateral donors view statebuilding as one of the
major pillars of their strategies in fragile and post-conflict countries.26 Building
state capacity to enable post-conflict countries to better govern themselves has
thus become the single most integral element of international peacebuilding
interventions. Yet the combination of statebuilding and peacebuilding into
one meta-enterprise conflates what are in reality two separate processes: build-
ing the structures of the state (statebuilding) and crafting sustainable peace on
the ground (peacebuilding).27 Many scholars recognize the problematic nature
of the overlap between the two processes and have pointed out serious flaws in
this peacebuilding paradigm. Critical theorists have argued that the liberal
objectives underpinning the model are an inappropriate imposition of exter-
nally generated, especially Western, ideals in post-conflict countries.28 Even
scholars adopting a positivist lens have noted that peace operations are, in
many instances, extremely messy and prone to relative failure, with most of
the challenges relating to contradictions built into the model.29
The internationalized and interventionist nature of peacebuilding gener-
ates additional challenges. Paris and Sisk have observed that contradictions
are ‘embedded in the very idea of externally assisted state-building’, including,
for example, competing imperatives between short-term and long-term
goals.30 Practically, too, international interventions all too often fall short of
achieving their expressed objectives in terms of state capacity and public
service provision, let alone the loftier ideals of democracy.31 Moreover, the
more the international community involves itself in the process of creating
a viable state and building a sustainable peace, the more evident is the lack
of the local autonomy necessary to own and operate that state. Challenges
to state sovereignty seem to be deeply ingrained in the nature of international
peacebuilding, especially in the context of large-scale peacebuilding interven-
tions.32 The inherent contradiction is clear: peacebuilding constitutes an
attempt to build domestic sovereignty through an international exercise.33
26McCandless, “Peace Dividends”; and Menocal, “New Paradigm”.
27Often third and fourth processes of establishing a democratic regime type (democratization) and a
market economy (neoliberalism) are also bundled into the enterprise, but these are outside the
scope of this paper.
28Chandler, Empire in Denial; Cooper, Turner, and Pugh “Last Peacebuilder”; and Pugh, “Critical Theory”.
29Autesserre, Congo; Barma, The Peacebuilding Puzzle; Paris, At War’s End; Pugh, “Critical Theory”; and
Snyder, From Voting to Violence.
30Paris and Sisk, Dilemmas of Statebuilding, 305; Levy, “Lessons from Social Psychology”; and Roeder and
Rothchild, Sustainable Peace.
31Guttieri and Piombo, Interim Governments; and Lake and Fariss, “International Trusteeship”.
32Krasner, “Sharing Sovereignty”; and Fearon and Laitin, “Neo-Trusteeship”.
33Zaum, The Sovereignty Paradox.
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Some critics of external statebuilding go so far as to claim that such peace-
building efforts constitute a new form of imperialism or colonialism.34
Nearly three decades into the modern era of peacebuilding, despite these
heated debates over the merits of this internationally led, state- or institution-
orientedmodel, there remains a basic commitment to this form of peacebuilding
intervention. Local opposition to internationally imposed formulas has success-
fullymanaged to shift the particular details ofwhat transplanted institutions look
like and howmuch attention is given to local and traditional forms of governance
and, in many cases, the size and complexity of intervention has been scaled
back.35 Yet in key ongoing interventions across the globe – including those in
Afghanistan, South Sudan andBurundi, for example– the international commu-
nity retains its core commitment to statebuilding as theway to build peace. At the
same time, despite the prolific amountofwork that has discussed the problematic
overlap between peacebuilding and statebuilding on the one hand and the chal-
lenges associated with the internationalization of peacebuilding on the other,
there has been little progress in identifying how statebuilding and peacebuilding
interact in practice as an empirical matter.
The remainder of this paper proposes a conceptual framework to resolve
some of these intellectual and practical knots. First, we suggest disentangling
statebuilding and peacebuilding by viewing them as distinct causal processes
related in theory and practice to two different sets of outcomes. We then
propose a focus on the myriad ways in which the delivery of aid varies –
what we term aid dynamics – as a crucial influence on the extent to which
the goals of statebuilding and peacebuilding are achieved. Delineating aid
dynamics as a key causal variable is not a big leap from the conventional
wisdom: the high levels of international involvement in fragile and conflict-
affected states simply would not exist if international actors did not expect
this engagement to be effective. Yet we argue that scholars should not hold
the ex ante belief that international assistance produces the intervener’s
desired outcomes, nor should we begin with the normative conviction that
aid necessarily creates perverse outcomes. Instead, in the final section, we
propose a research agenda geared towards analysing the causal processes by
which the dynamics of aid affect statebuilding and peacebuilding goals,
framing this as a fundamentally empirical question.
Disentangling Statebuilding and Peacebuilding: Processes and
Outcomes
Statebuilding and peacebuilding are best understood as distinct processes that
are oriented towards achieving improvements in two different sets of goals or
34Pugh, “Critical Theory”; and Chandler, “Other Regarding Ethics”.
35Autesserre, Congo; Richmond, Post-Liberal Peace.
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outcomes in post-conflict countries. In addition to disentangling statebuilding
and peacebuilding from each other, the inputs to these processes must be ana-
lytically distinguished from their outcomes if we are to understand the causal
processes by which statebuilding and peacebuilding activities might lead to
particular results. In this view, the statebuilding process involves actions
intended to enhance state coherence, whereas the peacebuilding process
involves actions intended to improve the depth of peace. In order to gauge
the effectiveness of statebuilding and peacebuilding efforts, we conceptualize
and assess the outcomes of each in terms of these two variables: state coher-
ence measures the functioning of the state apparatus, while the depth of peace
measures the degree to which a country has built a comprehensive and sus-
tainable peace. Separating out the two sets of outcomes in this manner
enables analytical purchase, in turn, on a deeper theoretical and empirical
investigation of the relationship between state coherence and the depth of
peace. In other words, this conceptual step affords us a lens on the question
of whether attempts to strengthen the state apparatus in post-conflict
countries does indeed lead to better outcomes in the realm of sustainable
peace.
Each of these outcome variables is non-dichotomous, ranges in value, and
can be measured across multiple dimensions and at different levels of analysis,
as follows.
State coherence. The ‘state coherence’ variable gauges the strength of the
formal, modern state. It aims to capture the variation in how effectively state
institutions are able to carry out the tasks of governance and achieve the
state’s goals, as well as to capture for whom the state governs in terms of
how its authority is achieved and whether it is perceived as legitimate. The
‘state’ refers to the formal, juridical institutions of government: executive and
policy-making bodies, bureaucratic and military apparatus, and rule of law
institutions and structures.36 State coherence varies along three inter-related
dimensions.
(1) The authority of the state captures the degree of control of the state, in
terms of its ability to maintain public order through the rule of law or
otherwise, secure its borders, collect the revenue it needs to pay for its
activities, and maintain a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence.
(2) The effectiveness of the state captures its ability to carry out policies,
perform governance functions, and achieve desired outcomes.
36While informal systems of power may undergird or compete with these formal structures, the distinction
between them remains important – thus the classic distinction between juridical and empirical statehood
presented by Jackson and Rosberg, “Africa’s Weak States”. The state is distinct from the administration or
regime that runs it, and is also different from the specific regime type – the form of that administration
and the nature of how it comes to and exercises power. A state is recognized by the international com-
munity as the sovereign ruler of a given territory.
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(3) The legitimacy of the state captures the extent to which society views gov-
ernance by the state as normatively and empirically legitimate.
These dimensions capture the variation in the degree of control states wield
within their societies, in their abilities to articulate and carry out their visions
and policies, and in the extent to which they are viewed by society as legitimate.
State coherence varies along a continuum ranging from incoherent to
coherent. State incoherence is characterized by a lack of authority, an inability
to provide basic public services or set coherent policies, and widespread ques-
tioning of state legitimacy. Coherent states, by contrast, broadcast their auth-
ority, satisfy the social contract, and are widely viewed as legitimate. The
variation in state coherence can manifest differently across these dimensions
– states are neither wholly coherent nor incoherent. Like Krasner and Risse
and Hanson, we separate out the questions of the state’s authority or infra-
structural power from its capacity to deliver services.37 State coherence can
also vary across the different sectors of a state’s activity. Often, states are selec-
tive about the sectors in which they build strength and capacity – choosing, for
example, to privilege the security or extractive sectors over the social services,
thus being able to maintain order and broadcast authority effectively even
while being ineffective in providing basic public services. Finally, there may
be important sub-national variation in this variable, across geographic or
demographic units within a country.
This conceptualization views state coherence akin to what many label ‘gov-
ernance’, absent the emphasis on participation or democratic regime type.
Englebert, too, defines good governance as a state with accountable and effi-
cient institutions, and also explicitly does not tie this to democracy.38 Similar
to Fukuyama’s recent work on governance – in contrast to his earlier work on
statebuilding – we focus on state coherence as the authority of a state to set
and implement policy goals and to do so with a degree of effectiveness and
legitimacy.39 In other words, we focus less on scope, or the range of activities
in which the state engages, as a measure of state coherence and instead
emphasize the authority of the state, its effectiveness in carrying out the
duties it has chosen to execute and the services it provides, and its perceived
legitimacy in the eyes of those whom it purports to serve.
Depth of peace. The ‘depth of peace’ variable measures the extent to which
a society has developed a degree of resilience to channel conflict and
prevent large-scale violence. It captures the ‘peacefulness’ of a society, including
the extent to which a society can channel and resolve tensions and conflicts
without resorting to violence. The depth of peace has three core dimensions.
37Krasner and Risse, “External Actors”; Hanson, “Complements or Substitutes”; and Mann, Sources of Social
Power.
38Englebert, State Legitimacy.
39Fukuyama, “What is Governance”; and Fukuyama, State-Building.
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(1) The absence of violence captures the ‘negative peace’ by measuring the
extent of violence in society at multiple levels, from organized to
routine violence.
(2) Post-conflict recovery captures how well a post-conflict society has
managed to normalize, including societal healing and the restoration of
peaceful relations.
(3) Conflict resilience captures how a society manages conflict through
mechanisms that prevent tensions from erupting into violence, or that
help to contain violence once it breaks out.
These three dimensions together form a continuous variable that ranges
from a lack of peace characterized by high degrees of violent conflict, to a
broad and sustainable peace where multiple mechanisms work to channel ten-
sions and reduce the likelihood that violent conflict will erupt.
Our conception of ‘depth of peace’ thus captures the peacefulness of a
society in a manner that builds on the distinction between the ‘negative
peace’ and the ‘positive peace’ most closely associated with Johan
Galtung.40 The deepest peace will not only reflect a minimal degree of both
organized and casual violence, it will also foster conditions that promote
human security. In a post-conflict situation, this type of peace represents ‘con-
flict transformation’, in which the relationships between the parties in conflict
have normalized, fundamentally changing from one of conflict and violence
to one of arbitration, management, and even resolution. As with state coher-
ence, the depth of peace can vary sub-nationally, temporally, and across
public service delivery sectors. Moreover, the three dimensions may not
necessarily co-vary across these levels of analysis.
A deep peace is not one where no conflict exists, but where conflict does
not lead to violence in most instances. Instead, political, economic, and
social tensions and competition are processed through various institutions
within society. The concept thus captures ‘the capacity of social systems to
absorb stress, adapt and repair’.41 This conception of peace does not rely
on formal state institutions, nor is it keyed to a particular regime type. Politi-
cal tensions will be processed and managed by institutions of governance,
whether formal or informal; economic tensions may be handled either by
the market or state-mediated mechanisms (or some combination); and
societal tensions by civil society, state institutions, or traditional and other
informal mechanisms, as appropriate. When such mechanisms break down
society is less resilient and the normal tensions and conflicts within society
are more likely to escalate into violence. The overall resilience represented
40Galtung, “Peace Research”.
41Resilience is viewed as a consequence of peace by IEP, Pillars of Peace, 2. By contrast, we conceptualize
societal resilience and the ability to process conflict as part of what creates a durable, positive peace at all
levels of a society.
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by the depth of peace concept is especially important in a country that has
emerged from war and large-scale violence, since the mechanisms to
manage tension may have been eroded during the violence and their repair,
in turn, constitutes a key element of post-conflict peacebuilding.
Disentangling statebuilding and peacebuilding from each other and taking a
causal approach to how these two distinct processes result in the outcomes of
state coherence and the depth of peace enables us to unpack international inter-
ventions into their analytically distinct components or activities. While state-
building and peacebuilding may intimately affect one another, they follow
separate pathways and contribute to different outcomes. It may indeed be the
case, per the conventional wisdom, that some elements of statebuilding and
peacebuilding reinforce enhancements in both state coherence and depth of
peace. Sometimes, however, the mechanisms to achieve one of these sets of
goals are counterproductive for attaining the other. Menocal offers a balanced
analysis of the complementarities and tensions between the two processes.42 In
terms of complementarities, statebuilding can help to build more inclusive
societies and legitimate political settlements centred around the state apparatus
and the state–society interface. In terms of tensions, achieving greater state
coherence may require a different form of political settlement from deepening
the peace, especially when elites face competing imperatives. Moreover, as both
Menocal and Mcloughlin note, statebuilding with the express purpose of
enhancing service delivery is not related linearly to the pursuit of political legiti-
macy.43 Our approach enables conceptual and empirical investigations of the
relationship between statebuilding and peacebuilding.
The Effects of Aid Dynamics
The peacebuilding scholarship has wrestled with the question of how inter-
national interventions actually assist societies in achieving improvements in
state capacity and sustainable peace. The focus in this literature has been
on comprehensive international interventions that, in addition to providing
peacekeeping functions, deliver significant financial aid, policy advice, and
technical assistance to post-conflict countries, such as the peacebuilding
efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, East Timor, and Kosovo. In exam-
ining the ways in which such international interventions succeed or fail in
achieving their mandates, a great deal has been written about the effect of
different types of peacebuilding operation.44
Much less has been said about the consequences of the degree of interven-
tion. The reality of how the international community pursues statebuilding
42Menocal, “New Paradigm”. See, also, Haider, “Conflict and Fragility”.
43Menocal, “New Paradigm”; and Mcloughlin, “Service Delivery”.
44Chesterman, You, The People; and Caplan, International Governance.
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and peacebuilding is that large multi-dimensional interventions geared
towards post-conflict recovery represent a small and specific subset of the
broad range of post-conflict activities. Focusing solely on the big, recognizable
peace operations, as has much of the peacebuilding scholarship, restricts our
understanding of the broad range of engagement strategies. Even countries
that do not have large-scale international interventions receive varying
degrees and forms of multilateral, regional, and bilateral assistance – and
this can and does vary over time.
Uganda, for example, experienced recovery without significant inter-
national assistance after its civil war ended in 1986; but by the early 2000s
it had become a highly aided and aid-dependent country. There are also
examples where governments receive significant external assistance but are
very controlled and deliberate in how they direct and use that assistance,
representing a form of autonomy even in a highly aided context. Laos and
Rwanda are good examples of a high degree of local control and decision-
making autonomy, even when significantly aided.45 In reality, too, there are
instances of more fully autonomous or indigenous post-conflict recovery, in
which internal decision-makers and actors pursue reforms to achieve sustain-
able peace and improvements in state capacity in the relative absence of coor-
dinated international intervention. Yet, as Weinstein observed, surprisingly
little research has been undertaken on the similarities and differences
between international peace operations and autonomous processes of state-
building and peacebuilding.46
We propose that aid dynamics should be viewed as a major explanatory
variable in the quest to understand the outcomes associated with statebuilding
and peacebuilding efforts. It is certainly not the only causal variable worth
examining; other crucial dimensions of context, including the nature of the
preceding conflict, the particular configuration of elites, and latent social
and economic cleavages matter a great deal, of course. Nevertheless, recent
work on statebuilding and peacebuilding in the practitioner community has
similarly highlighted the importance of distinguishing among the myriad
ways in which development partners engage to improve service delivery as
the means towards building state capacity and helping societies recover
from conflict. In particular, the specific modalities through which develop-
ment partners aim to support public service delivery influences both the effec-
tiveness with which those services are delivered and the extent to which the
domestic government gains legitimacy for that function being performed.
The United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID)
thus states, ‘ … service delivery, depending on how it is undertaken
45A state’s capacity determines, to some extent, the possibility for it to assert these higher levels of local
autonomy – yet it appears that even states with relatively low levels of capacity, such as Laos, can yet
exert a higher degree of independence.
46Weinstein, “Autonomous Recovery”.
12 N. H. BARMA ET AL.
(exclusively versus inclusively, by which type of provider, and to which groups
of people) can contribute either positively, negatively or neutrally to wider
state-building and peace-building processes’, while at the same time noting
the lack of clarity about causal mechanisms and a dearth of evidence.47 The
OECD similarly notes that engaging with recipient post-conflict governments
on statebuilding initiatives is a question of degree rather than a dichotomous
choice and that careful strategic programming is required to mitigate the
dilemmas often associated with externally driven service provision.48
To better conceptualize the role of aid dynamics in statebuilding and
peacebuilding, we turn to the rich scholarship that seeks to understand the
effectiveness of international aid on economic growth and development.
One vein of this literature evaluates whether international aid contributes
to the strength of developing countries’ economies. Whether economic
growth, levels of investment, or savings rates are evaluated as the primary
outcome, aid seems to have little positive effect on economic success, if any.
Summing this up, one meta-analysis of the literature characterizes the
results of 40 years of research as ‘sad’.49 A second strand of the aid effective-
ness literature is closer to our own interest in statebuilding in that it asks
whether improvements in governance accompany development assistance.
Some scholars have found that international aid can have positive effects
on governance. Aid can, for example, be crucial in filling immediate gaps in
public service provision and, in the longer run, can help to relieve a
binding constraint on the better functioning of bureaucracy and the rule of
law through such mechanisms as improving civil service salaries, or facilitate
the survival of reform-minded governments.50 Carefully designed approaches
to building human resource skills through technical assistance can indeed
cumulate to enhancements in overall government capacity.51 When aid for
institutional reform is tailored to local context and specific governance chal-
lenges it can help to build the sustainable problem-solving capacity that is
essential to sound governance.52
Most scholars accept, nonetheless, that even if aid has some positive effects
on governance, it certainly also operates in negative ways – and that the ulti-
mate direction of causality is an empirical question about the relative weight-
ing of causal effects.53 The vast majority of work that investigates the effects of
aid on governance paints a grim picture. Knack, for example, found ‘evidence
that aid levels erode the quality of governance, as measured by indices of
47DFID, Literature Review, 44.
48OECD, Concepts and Dilemmas. See, also, OECD, Do No Harm.
49Doucouliagos and Paldam, “Sad Results”.
50Barma, Huybens, and Viñuela, Institutions Taking Root; and Gisselquist, “Comparative Analysis”.
51Teskey, “Capacity Development”.
52Levy, Working with the Grain; and Pritchett, Woolcock, and Andrews, “Looking Like a State”.
53Brazys, “Negative Returns”, suggests the existence of a non-linear ‘aid dependence Laffer curve’,
whereby aid has positive effects on governance to start with but too much aid leads to negative returns.
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bureaucratic quality, corruption, and the rule of law’.54 There are a number of
mechanisms by which development aid can all too often undermine the very
goals it is attempting to achieve in a syndrome known as aid dependence. One
significant theme in the aid effectiveness literature concerns the wastage of aid
monies, through simple mismanagement as well as embezzlement and
fraud.55 This problem is especially intractable because aid is fungible: it is
virtually impossible to earmark aid for particular purposes.56 In turn, this
enables a higher degree of rent seeking and rent distribution than would
otherwise have been possible.57 Consequently, aid can increase corruption
or generate outright conflict over the control of aid, thus increasing political
instability and predation by increasing the incentives to gain and retain
control of the government.58 A second significant theme is what has come
to be dubbed the ‘aid curse’.59 In a logic similar to that of the resource
curse, government accountability is diminished when externally provided
resources reduce its need to raise tax revenue. When aid substitutes for taxa-
tion, it weakens the state–society contract which is essential for building state
legitimacy.60 Ultimately, external assistance can reduce the costs of doing
nothing and help bad governments survive by giving them the resources to
do so.61 Moreover, aid can crowd out other productive economic sectors
and diligent public sector effort in the business of government; and aid can
weaken bureaucracy by siphoning off talented, high-capacity actors.62
In sum, the aid effectiveness literature points to the high likelihood that
international interventions have the propensity to weaken state capacity
instead of building it. Fukuyama observes that a big influx of aid is very
likely to undermine state capacity ‘unless donors make a clear choice that
capacity-building is their primary objective rather than the services that the
capacity is meant to provide’.63 Similarly, Brautigam states, ‘Large amounts
of aid, delivered to countries with weak institutions create some of the insti-
tutional problems that lead to ineffectiveness’.64 Practitioners have attempted
to use conditionality as a way to improve governance but analysts have largely
concluded that this simply does not lead to better outcomes.65 Consequently,
the literature points to an aid–institutions paradox: aid tends to be more
54Knack, “Aid Dependence”.
55See, for example, Ghani and Lockhart, Fixing Failed States.
56Dollar and Pritchett, Assessing Aid.
57Tornell and Lane, “Voracity Effect”.
58Barma, The Peacebuilding Puzzle.
59See, for example, Ear, “Political Economy”; and Moyo, Dead Aid.
60Bates, Prosperity & Violence; and Moore, “Revenues”.
61Easterly, White Man’s Burden; Rodrik, “Understanding”; and Van de Walle, African Economies.
62Ear, “Political Economy”; Brautigam, Aid Dependence; and Dollar and Pritchett, Assessing Aid.
63Fukuyama, State-Building, 41–2.
64Brautigam, Aid Dependence, 1.
65Collier, “Failure of Conditionality”; Dollar and Pritchett, Assessing Aid; and Kapur and Webb, “Governance-
related Conditionalities”.
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effective when institutional quality is better but whether aid improves insti-
tutional quality is highly dependent on the manner in which it is deployed.
Drawing on these insights from the aid effectiveness literature, we suggest
that aid dynamics play a key role in producing the outcomes associated with
statebuilding and peacebuilding. Resting on the insights that statebuilding and
peacebuilding efforts are typically intertwined and almost invariably focused
on enhancing public service delivery as a central objective, it is crucial to
understand the wide variation in how much recovery efforts are, in fact,
driven by external actors and the effects of that internationalization. In a
sense, this approach attempts to incorporate the thinking of hybrid peace
scholarship, which posits that the most effective peacebuilding interventions
will comprise both top-down and bottom-up processes in ways that comp-
lement each other.66 Conceptualizing aid dynamics in the manner we
propose here enables systematic investigation into how different mixes of
externally driven and indigenous approaches to statebuilding and peacebuild-
ing influence desired outcomes. It thus offers one way of considering how
much processes from below, at least those mediated through recipient
country governments and non-governmental agencies, are incorporated
into top-down peacebuilding, along with the effects of that balance, concepts
that Donais notes are often ambiguous.67 Like the two variables described
above, the aid dynamics variable is non-dichotomous, ranges in value, and
can be measured across multiple dimensions and at different levels of analysis,
as follows.
Aid dynamics. The ‘aid dynamics’ variable gauges the extent to which and
the manner in which – or how much and in what ways – the international
community provides assistance and direction in the provision of public ser-
vices as part of statebuilding and peacebuilding efforts. Aid dynamics can
vary on three core dimensions, colloquially, how much assistance there is,
what it is intended for, and how it is implemented.
(1) The level of aid captures the volume of financial assistance, the share of
overall assistance targeted to public service delivery, and the predictability
and continuity of assistance over time.
(2) The purpose of aid captures the degree to which assistance is intended to
shape government policy and priorities in terms of service delivery, the
source of assistance, and the sequencing of assistance.
(3) The administration of aid captures the recipient government’s overall
systems for aid management, and the manner and extent of direct exter-
nal involvement in the day-to-day functioning of governance organiz-
ations and in actual service provision.
66Boege, et al., “Hybrid Political Orders”; and Richmond and Franks, Liberal Peace Transitions.
67Donais, Peacebuilding and Local Ownership.
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These three dimensions capture different aspects of how international
interventions influence local contexts: they can vary in terms of volume of
aid; they can be more or less dominant in setting the substance of policy;
and they can complement (and therefore support) or substitute for (and
therefore compete with or supplant) the business of the state and service pro-
vision in different ways.
Aid dynamics vary along a continuum ranging from no international pres-
ence or full internal autonomy to wholesale and direct external involvement
and even dominance, indicating full dependence on the part of the recipient
government. There are instances of indigenous post-conflict statebuilding and
peacebuilding, in which local decision-makers and actors pursue reforms to
achieve sustainable peace and improvements in state capacity in the relative
absence of international assistance. In other cases, even when highly depen-
dent on aid revenues, some governments exert purposeful control over that
aid through policies and implementation processes and thereby retain a
degree of autonomy vis-à-vis international actors. By contrast, interventions
with a high degree of aid attempt to implement statebuilding and peacebuild-
ing programmes through the direct and coordinated involvement of inter-
national actors and significant international resources – financial, policy,
and technical – in these processes. The dynamics of aid in statebuilding
and peacebuilding efforts represent a continuous variable capturing the mix
of domestic and international agency that fluctuates not just at the country
level, but also over time, across sub-national localities, and across public
service delivery sectors. Like the relationship between aid and governance,
different amounts and forms of international assistance are likely to have
both positive and negative impacts on state coherence and the depth of peace.
A New Conceptual Framework and a Research Agenda
The preceding sections have cleared conceptual ground in the contemporary
scholarly approach to statebuilding and peacebuilding and specified three sets
of variables to better guide research. We turn now to the conceptual frame-
work that links these variables and that we believe could be fruitfully used
in empirical investigations of statebuilding and peacebuilding. As noted
above, the extant literature focuses on external efforts to foster sustainable
peace through the building or strengthening of state institutions. This elides
theoretical and empirical analysis of how the particular balance between
internal and external agency drives recovery efforts – or the ways in which
top-down and bottom-up processes of recovery complement or contradict
each other – and conflates the processes of statebuilding and peacebuilding
with the outcomes of those efforts. We posit that the dynamics of aid itself
exerts a series of causal effects on the outcomes of state capacity and sustain-
able peace. As represented in the schematic in Figure 1, we examine
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statebuilding and peacebuilding as two distinct post-conflict recovery processes.
We aim to understand how statebuilding and peacebuilding actually operate by
viewing these processes through the lens of a causal approach, with aid
dynamics as a primary independent variable driving a range of outcomes on
two dependent variables: state coherence and depth of peace. In turn, we can
examine the nature of the empirical relationship that links these two sets of out-
comes. Each of these empirical relationships can and should be analysed as to
whether they are negative, neutral, or positive and to gain a better apprehension
of the conditions under which those outcomes occur.
A Broader Research Agenda
The conceptual framework we propose here enables an examination of the
systematic causal mechanisms and outcomes generated when the statebuild-
ing and peacebuilding enterprises are internationalized to different degrees. It
can inform a wide range of empirical research with the potential to uncover
important causal dynamics in the statebuilding and peacebuilding processes.
The causal approach we propose is built on two conceptual innovations. First,
it allows us to treat the dynamics of external actors’ statebuilding and peace-
building activities as independent, causal variables, instead of conflating inter-
national assistance with these processes by assuming that they are
internationalized. Second, by distinguishing statebuilding from peacebuilding
our framework helps focus analysis on the separate outcomes to which these
two distinct processes are geared: the strength of the state and of the peace.
These are discrete concepts and should be treated as such. They might tend
to co-vary, with similar actions strengthening both, as is the conventional
wisdom. But, crucially, we also might find that actions that tend to strengthen
one weaken the other.
Figure 1. A causal approach to understanding statebuilding and peacebuilding.
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Empirically, too, our approach advances the study of statebuilding and
peacebuilding in that it enables multi-dimensional conceptual definitions of
each of the variables – aid dynamics, state coherence, and depth of peace –
in a manner that responds to Diehl’s call for more finely grained measures
developed specifically for the study of peacebuilding.68 Such definitions
permit an analysis of the relationships between each of the different dimen-
sions of each variable. In addition, since our conception of aid dynamics cap-
tures the concept of a mix between internal and external agency, the
framework could even be adapted to study a two-way interaction whereby
local actors are shaping the relationship as much as external interveners in
what Donais terms a process of ‘negotiated hybridity’.69 It is therefore amen-
able to a more discursive and inter-subjective analysis of the multiple relation-
ships among these variables and their different dimensions.
The framework can also be applied at multiple levels of analysis to identify
patterns in the relationships between the various dimensions of the three key
variables. A cross-national macro-level dataset could, for example, include
measures of each dimension of the variables described above. Qualitative
field-based research could apply the framework at the meso-level, investi-
gating state coherence and depth of peace as separate outcomes of sector-
specific efforts or sub-national units in post-conflict reconstruction.70 Sectoral
level measures could examine statebuilding and peacebuilding efforts as
enacted with respect to specific sectors of government activity: education,
healthcare, and public works provision, to name a few. The degree and type
of reconstruction of these sectors is likely to vary across them, among
various localities within a country, and to ebb and flow over time – and
this variation in outcomes affords crucial analytical leverage as to the
effects of aid dynamics.71 International aid also varies demonstrably by
sector, geography, and time. Disaggregating the sites at which the outcomes
of state coherence and depth of peace are measured would allow more
nuanced analysis and thereby a more finely grained comparison of causal pro-
cesses. Finally, while international aid does not manifest at the individual
level, our outcome variables could be conceptualized and measured at the
individual level. A rich avenue for future empirical work could leverage
higher level variation in aid dynamics to ascertain its effects on individual citi-
zens’ perceptions of societal trust, personal security, and state legitimacy.
While the framework can be applied at multiple levels of analysis, we posit
that public service provision in post-conflict countries offers particularly
68Diehl, “Behavioral Studies”.
69Donais, Peacebuilding and Local Ownership, 3.
70Autesserre similarly notes the value in undertaking micro- and local-level analyses aimed at understand-
ing the ways in which international interventions unfold on the ground in “Going Micro”.
71Cutting edge research in the politics of public service delivery rests on the insight that the political
dynamics of service provision differ in important ways across sectors. See, for example, Batley and
Mcloughlin, “Service Characteristics”; and Lieberman, “Comparative Politics”.
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fertile empirical ground for several reasons in line with emerging work in the
fields of statebuilding and peacebuilding. First, the provision of services is one
of the most direct ways in which states interact with their citizens – hence,
examining the empirical relationships between aid dynamics, state coherence,
and depth of peace in the arena of public service delivery enables a better
understanding of the relationship between the state and society at their
point of closest contact. In the post-conflict context, this can take on a particu-
lar salience as some states use public services as a peacebuilding tool – provid-
ing services as a way to help quell discontent, reduce grievances, and build
loyalty.72 Second, as much as the provision of public services can serve as a
method to build state coherence and deepen peace, it can also create tensions
over symbolic issues such as identity and material issues such as service dis-
tribution, access, and quality – challenging both state legitimacy and conflict
resilience.73
Third, international assistance efforts often focus on helping states to
provide services or they directly provide those services on behalf of states.
This aid strategy has emerged as a result of the notion that external interven-
tions should help post-conflict states to deliver upon their compacts with
society as a means to enhance the prospect of sustainable peace – and that
achieving this goal is something that international development partners
are well-placed to do, by focusing on state capacity-building. Yet, as
Krasner and Risse observe, ‘we know surprisingly little about the effectiveness
of external efforts at state-building, or public service provision in areas of
limited statehood’.74 They similarly problematize the question of whether
state capacity and service provision are empirically related in areas of
limited statehood. Lee, Walter-Drop, and Wiesel demonstrate, counter to
conventional wisdom, that the relationship between degrees of state capacity
and the provision of public services in the developing world is relatively
weak.75 Conceptually, in short, public service delivery offers an arena for
examining both how states interact with their citizens and how international
agencies interact with states. Empirically, moreover, service provision serves
as a site at which our three core variables – aid dynamics, state coherence,
and depth of peace – can be examined together.
Conclusion and Implications
Like many scholars of international liberal peacebuilding, we are sceptical of
the effectiveness of the enterprise. We recognize that the sovereignty contra-
dictions inherent in external statebuilding and liberal peacebuilding are easy
72Barma, Huybens, and Viñuela, Institutions Taking Root; and Gisselquist, “Hard Places”.
73Brinkerhoff, Wetterberg, and Dunn, “Water Services”; and Mcloughlin, “Service Delivery”.
74Krasner and Risse, “External Actors”, 546.
75Lee, Walter-Drop, and Wiesel, “Taking the State (Back) Out”.
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fodder for normative critique. Rather than rejecting the enterprise wholesale,
however, we seek to understand how variation in aid dynamics affects the out-
comes of state coherence and depth of peace. Our work thus fits into the broad
range of scholarship that views peacebuilding as ‘too important to lose or
abandon’ and focuses on how peacebuilding and statebuilding might be
pursued more effectively.76
Our treatment of statebuilding and peacebuilding as separate causal pro-
cesses with a nuanced understanding of aid dynamics as a crucial independent
variable allows us to examine critiques of external statebuilding and peace-
building as an empirical question instead of a normative one. When and
how are these sorts of efforts successful? When do the processes by which
these objectives are sought achieve their goals and when do they act at
cross-purposes to each other? Ultimately, we believe that the conceptual fra-
mework that informs our research has the potential to disentangle the causal
mechanisms by which peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts result in their
various outcomes. Empirical research based on our conceptual framework
could (and should) illuminate precisely the many complexities the rich and
varied peacebuilding literature emphasizes – over time, across countries,
across different issue spaces – with different theoretical emphases. We
present it now in the hope that others will also use it to develop a broad
empirical research agenda focused on identifying how different types of inter-
ventions by a wide range of actors affect the various sets of objectives they
seek.
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